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In June 1956, Indonesian President Sukarno stood up a special convocation at McGill University to receive an honourary doctorate of law. Draped in McGill’s red and white robes which matched the colours of the Indonesian flag, he praised the university’s Institute of Islamic Studies (IIS).\(^1\) Sukarno said he knew “a little of the story of James McGill, fur-trader, soldier and far-sighted visionary” — enough to know that the university’s founder would have been “very glad and very delighted indeed could he but know that the beliefs and culture of Islam are being studied so intensively here today.”\(^ii\) Indeed, the Montreal-based Institute was the main channel through which Canadians approached the Islamic world in the immediate postwar years. Although it was seeking a more prominent global diplomatic role, including towards Asia, the government of Canada had few close ties to Southeast Asia – and those that it did were largely mediated through the “North Atlantic triangle” of Canadian relations with the United States and Britain. Its first embassy in the region opened in the Indonesian capital, Jakarta, in 1953. With government-to-government relations limited, non-governmental diplomacy often played a more fundamental role.

Canadian-Asian relations must be studied not only in terms of diplomacy, but also include trade, immigration and missionary work (Lee 1995). Canada’s approach to Asia took place not only in political and economic means, but also through religion and education. The important role of Canadian Christian missionaries in Asia, for instance, has received a great deal of attention. These trans-Pacific religious connections, however, were not limited to Christianity: the case of the Institute of Islamic Studies shows how they could be mediated through other religions as well. This essay addresses the formative years of the IIS in the 1950s and 1960s, thereby helping to highlight some of the more neglected aspects of Canadian relations with Asia. It considers early connections to
Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country in the world, and the Asian state with which the IIS has the longest and most important ties. By emphasizing the role of a non-governmental actor, it also demonstrates the importance of non-state diplomacy in weaving the fabric of Canadian-Asian relations within the general parameters set out by Canadian diplomacy. In many cases, non-government actors played a role in shaping the direction of that diplomacy. Missionaries and their children influenced Canadian images and the Canadian approach to China; the Institute of Pacific Relations’ move from New York to Vancouver both reflected and affected a different emphasis in Canadian and American attitudes towards Asia; wheat farmers’ wish for Asian markets opened doors to China and altered the pattern of Canadian aid to India and Pakistan (Evans & Frolic 1991; Woods 1993; Spicer 1966). The Canadian government consciously defined its Asia policy as being broadly in line with Canada’s allies, but stressed Canada’s economic support for non-communist regimes in contrast to U.S. military aid – a contrast frequently overdrawn but nevertheless frequently asserted (St. Laurent 1952). The IIS role in shaping Islamic education in Indonesia dovetailed with the Canadian government’s self-defined mission in its relations with Asia as a whole, acting as a modernizing agent and in keeping with Canada’s cold war goals.

A conscious effort to move beyond the traditional Orientalist methods of teaching Islam, the Institute of Islamic Studies set itself the goal of both understanding Islam and shaping its future directions. Orientalism, the construction of the idea of “the Orient” in Western discourse about it, with the Orient as irrational Other to the West’s rational self (Said 1978) had a long provenance, but the postwar years threw it into flux. Was there still a future for a discipline centred on “the West’s application of reason to the data of Islam” (Smith 1957: 71)? The IIS was one attempt to answer that question in the affirmative, while transcending Orientalist preconceptions and methods. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, the Institute’s founder and guiding spirit throughout his tenure as director from 1951 to 1963, rejected conceptions of Islam as stagnant and unchanging. He insisted that Islam was
able to modernize itself, and offered the IIS as a guide towards modernity. The IIS tried to revivify Orientalism as a project in inter-cultural communications, but also saw itself as “midwife” to a more modern type of Islam, thus continuing some aspects of Orientalism’s attempt to control though knowing. It was born as part of the North American area studies complex founded in the postwar years with US foundation money, a complex implicated from the start in the cold war. Although the IIS flew its Canadian colours proudly, its role within the area studies complex paralleled that of the Canadian government within the Western alliance system. A Canadian initiative served the goals of a wider project of enmeshing countries like Indonesia in a Western-centred world, while offering Canada as a less self-interested partner.

The IIS quest to act as modernizing agent for the Islamic world was most effective in Indonesia. The role of Islam in the Indonesian state was an important issue even before that state was established in 1945. Early nationalist leaders opted not to create an explicitly Islamic republic, but historians generally still divide Indonesian nationalism into three streams using a typology popularized by Sukarno: Islamic nationalism, socialism, and “secular” nationalism (Sukarno 1970, Kahin 1952, Legge 1972). Sukarno had written little on Islam since the 1930s, but it remained a crucial part of his nationalist synthesis. In his vision, Islam was a stream feeding the nationalist river. It could be dangerous when it clashed with other streams, whether by holding them back through its resistance to change, or by pushing for an Islamic state (Noer 1973, Boland 1982). The type of Islam taught at McGill offered a more amenable style than that of the traditional Middle Eastern centres. Paradoxically, McGill also offered a refuge to Islamic thinkers disillusioned with the direction of the country under Sukarno. Political Islam clashed with Sukarno and fell from favour after 1957. At McGill, a new model of Islamic education was worked out with implications for the political involvement of Islam in the country, which echo down to today.
Defining the Institute

The Institute of Islamic Studies was, in the words of assistant director Charles Adams, “a unique Canadian institution” which “deserves the intelligent understanding and co-operation of all thoughtful Canadians” (Adams 1962). Although it grew into a bustling and influential organization, its early years were the story of “the lengthening shadow of a man,” Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Smith was an eminently respectable product of the Toronto establishment. (His elder brother Arnold became a prominent Canadian diplomat and the first Secretary-General of the Commonwealth.) He was born in Toronto in 1916 and educated at Upper Canada College (rising to head boy in 1933) and the University of Toronto. There, he was active in Knox Church, the Student Volunteer Movement for Overseas Missions and the Student Christian Movement. He went on to win a Massey fellowship to attend Cambridge University, where he studied divinity and made side trips to Oxford for additional study of Islamics under H.A.R. Gibb. In 1941 he took a post as “representative among the Muslims” for the Canadian Overseas Missions Council, reporting to a joint board of the Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian and United Churches. As their base, Smith and his wife Muriel (born to missionary parents in China) selected Forman Christian College in Lahore (then in British India, now in Pakistan). In Lahore, Smith completed Modern Islam in India, which was rejected as a thesis by Cambridge and banned in India because of its Marxist-inspired critique of British rule. Although Smith called himself a socialist, he also seems to have viewed missionary work as incompatible with Marxism. After completing his doctorate at Princeton, Smith accepted McGill’s invitation to take up the university’s first chair in comparative religion in 1949.

The university promptly set about building an institute around him, envisioned as a collaboration between McGill and the Rockefeller Foundation that could follow in the footsteps of the Rockefeller-funded Montreal Neurological Institute. That project, seen at the time as one of the Foundation’s most successful, had been built around the person of Wilder Penfield and paid for with
two Rockefeller endowments of $500,000 each. The original idea was for another institute that could be a bridge to India and Pakistan. McGill Principal F. Cyril James had grander schemes for what the growing university could do. James, an energetic English economist who had been recruited by McGill to head its School of Commerce, was the university’s Principal from 1939 to 1962 and thus “part of the imperial establishment,” in his biographer’s words. His recruiting of Smith as professor of comparative religion in the new Faculty of Divinity helped ensure that the new faculty developed away from a narrow Christian focus (Frost 1991, McMurray 1974).

James pressed the Rockefeller Foundation to back a new Institute of Commonwealth Studies built around Smith’s Indo-Pakistani expertise. “If it can be achieved,” James wrote to Joseph Willits of the Rockefeller Foundation, “it will in the course of time offer to the people of North America a chance to understand more clearly the culture, the philosophy and the habits of mind of both Pakistanis and Indians.” The attitudes of India and Pakistan in turn were central to the future of the Commonwealth, since they were a new and different element racially and religiously within the association. They were “the keys to the future of the Commonwealth - and perhaps to the future of democracy!” That was because the Commonwealth could quickly mobilize large resources on the Anglo-American side in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In short, James’ hope for a new centre at McGill reflected Canadian government cold war strategies. The Institute was intended as an anti-communist measure to bridge a perceived growing cultural divide between Europe and North America on the one hand, and their former colonies on the other. The eventual scope of the new institute, however, was defined by those who were paying for it. Rockefeller Foundation officers thought the Commonwealth Studies Institute was beyond McGill’s resources, proposing instead an Institute of Islamic Studies. In defining the scope of the new IIS, Smith spoke of studying a culture stretching from North Africa to Indonesia, rather than a limited area. Rockefeller Foundation officers called the project “sound” but thought it could not be done without increasing the annual budget past
Smith’s estimate of $33,000. They were also concerned that the Institute might over-emphasize Pakistan at the expense of the “heart of the Arab world,” and at “the tendency that Smith has to think of this Institute as ‘educating’ the Mohammedans.... Certainly we might hope that we would have some impact [on] the Islamic world but it should be entirely by indirection.” As long as James stayed closely involved, however, the foundation promised to green-light the Institute.iii Within just a few months of the initial conversations, the foundation gave McGill a bequest of $214,800 for the first five years of IIS operation, allowing an annual drawing of up to $46,000.iv

The Institute operated in Cottingham House, an “altogether delightful” four-storey stone mansion built into the side of the mountain on Montreal’s Redpath Crescent, where pheasants roamed the grounds at will. Few places would look less inviting to a student from the Middle East or Indonesia, who had to brave the winter winds of Montreal for a long hike up from the bus stop or the main McGill campus, a quarter of a mile away. Although this meant isolation from the rest of the university until the IIS was moved to the main campus in the mid-1960s, it also fostered a sense of community that was reinforced by the afternoon tea that Smith made a requirement for all people in the IIS building – prepared, in an attempt to realize the IIS vision of bringing Westerners and Muslims together, by one Western and one Muslim student every day.ix

IIS course offerings, all at the graduate level, stressed Islam in the modern world and the study of Islam as a living faith and as a “culture area.” Visiting professors from the Arab countries and McGill professors from other departments supplemented a core group of two Western and two Muslim professors.

The Institute may have been unorthodox, “neither fish nor fowl, guided neither by an area nor a social science discipline; all it had was Smith’s teleology.” But its students almost always spoke well of their experience. A Canadian diplomat who spent two years there studying for his M.A. praised “the Montreal viewpoint,” for its pure scholarship, its study of the ideal, and its stress on inter-cultural communication.x By 1955, the Rockefeller Foundation had agreed to the long-term
endowment sought by McGill, granting $500,000 (US$510,000) outright to the university to fund IIS operations past the initial five-year period. With this long-term endowment, the future of the Institute seemed secure. It was able to win support from other sources too, allowing constant growth until a financial squeeze set in after 1970. The Ford Foundation began by funding scholarships, but soon kicked in major donations of its own: $250,000 in 1957, later upped to $500,000 over seven years, with a further $235,000 to cover scholarships for Muslim students to come to McGill. The IIS also enjoyed a growing reputation in Islamic countries. The initial experiment had been a rousing success; it stood on firm ground a decade after its creation. When James stepped down as Principal in 1962, Smith soon followed, taking a post in comparative religion at Harvard, while Charles Adams moved up to director.

The IIS hoped to “cross the bridge” between the West and the Islamic world (Smith 1953). His words echoed the rhetoric of policymakers in Ottawa when speaking about foreign aid. Canadian government planners had started giving aid to Asia to stabilize the global economy and keep the region non-communist, but soon spoke of foreign aid as a humanitarian “bridge” linking the West and Asia. In the realm of non-state diplomacy, the IIS was trying fill a similar desire for bonds between the West and its former dependencies in Asia and Africa. Inevitably in the 1950s, that meant it had a cold war aspect.

The Institute, area studies, and the cold war

The Institute of Islamic Studies was born within the emerging area studies complex in North American universities, a non-governmental network which existed apart from government actions yet also complemented them. Area studies blossomed after 1945 with backing from the US government and large private foundations, reinventing the old methods of studying the Orient (Cumings 1997, Lewis and Wigen 1997: 166, Berman 1983: 102; Lewontin 1997). “Oriental Studies
were to be thought of not so much as scholarly activities but as instruments of national policy towards the newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the post-colonial world,” meant in part to build “modernizing elites” in Arab countries, according to Edward Said (1978: 175-6, 325). The Rockefeller and Ford Foundations financed the formation of a host of programmes for intensive study of various parts of the world. The drive in the United States for area studies was couched in strategic arguments (Wallerstein 1997). The new programmes received substantial government support, but the non-governmental big foundations played a vital role too. The cold war aspects of foundation-backed area studies would also drive critiques beginning in the 1960s, beginning in China studies and spreading.

As President of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1952, Dean Rusk told Congress “it was of the greatest importance for us to encourage concentrated attention on what was then called the weird languages, such languages as Indonesian, Burmese, some of the Indian dialects, some of the languages of Indochina... So we [the Foundation] have attached considerable importance to these area studies” (Trumpbour 1989: 96). Founded in 1909 with a mission to promote action “in the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, in the prevention and relief of suffering, and in the promotion of any and all of the elements of human progress,” the Rockefeller Foundation became increasingly interested in technical assistance under Rusk’s tenure from 1952-60 (Nielsen 1972: 50, Rockefeller Foundation 1954: 22-7). Rusk led a particular turn to the Third World in programming, on the grounds that:

Ideas and aspiration which were generated in the course of democratic, national and economic revolutions in the West are now producing explosive demands for far-reaching changes in other parts of the world.... The under-developed countries of today are borrowing ideas and aspirations and have examples of more “advanced” countries before their eyes; but they lack capital, trained leadership, an educated people, political stability, and an understanding of how change is to be digested and used by their own cultures (Shaplen 1964: 15).
The Foundation wished to provide skills to the less developed countries, so that they might develop along Western lines. Altruism combined with strong cold war motivations.

Cyril James was acutely conscious of this, employing anti-communist arguments extensively in his search for foundation funding. Resurgent political Islam appeared to many Western policymakers as greatly preferable to the communist adversary or even to “radical” Third World nationalism and neutralism. It was as a potential cold war ally. James argued that there were “three great religions in the world today, Christianity, Islam, and Communism - and Islam stands halfway between Christianity and Communism.... In a strategic sense, in the struggle between Russia and the West for the minds of men, the Islamic lands are critical areas.”

Editorials on the IIS in both Canada and the Islamic world praised it as part of an Islamic-Western alliance against communism. The world situation, *Saturday Night* editorialized, had given the West “a strong reason to seek a better knowledge of and sympathy with the group of nations whose concept of the universe is at least monotheistic and spiritual and entirely opposed to the gross materialism with which we are confronted in the Communist bloc” (*Saturday Night*, Nov. 1952). Similarly, one Pakistani newspaper wrote:

> Never was there greater need for world religions to pool their resources than to-day, when civilisation is threatened by one of the darkest forces known to history, a force out to reduce man to a producing machine and consuming animal, with no higher destiny than a few creature comforts.... Between them, the worlds of Islam and Christianity can accomplish a great deal to turn the tide of atheistic materialism and build a new and happier world on the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man — concepts which form the corner-stones both of Islam and Christianity.

The IIS, according to this editorial, was an integral part of this alliance against communism (*Civil and Military Gazette*, 26 Oct. 1952).

Area studies across North America were soon sucked into the McCarthyist maw. Investigations by the House of Representatives’ Un-American Activities Committee shattered China scholarship especially and scholarly enquiry generally. Being located in Canada did not free the IIS
from these pressures. Indeed, anti-communist professor Karl Wittfogel singled out Smith as a possible fellow traveler. Smith delivered the required anti-communist loyalty oath in both countries, informing both McGill and the Rockefeller Foundation that “I am not now, I have never been, and it was always true on principle and by conviction I never could be, a member of the Communist Party, either in India or anywhere else.” Communism was “evil, terribly evil” with “ultimately evil purposes,” in search “not of truth nor goodness nor even the classless society, but of power for the Kremlin.” Smith credited part of his disillusion from communism to the influence of his brother Arnold, who witnessed the realities of the Soviet Union as a diplomat at Canada’s Embassy in Moscow. The family connection was symbolic of a growing connection between the IIS and the Canadian government.

The IIS also wanted to engage with the Colombo Plan, the major channel for Canadian aid to Asia. “We have assumed far too glibly that in our relations with Afro-Asia all we have to do is give and teach,” Smith wrote in one of his best-known books. “The Canadian Government in the Colombo plan spends fifty million dollars a year in economic assistance and technical training. When it is suggested that along with this we should spend at least half of one per cent of such amounts on cultural interchange, so far this idea has not only not been accepted, it has not been understood — it is thought of as a frill if not a distraction, rather than as a serious and even necessary move in international affairs” (Smith 1962: 105). Soon after the IIS was founded, Smith began a campaign for Colombo Plan support for the humanities, which could make the Plan a bridge of two-way cultural communication. But Ottawa felt that this sort of exchange lay outside the Plan mandate, and suggested it be a non-governmental endeavour. Smith also lobbied Asian governments, even asking Sukarno to intervene, but without success. “We in the West have only a limited number of friends in Asia,” he wrote in a memo to James. “It is distressing to watch us alienating such as we have. Surely our Governments must do something to stop this.”
The IIS, then, was like many university centres entangled in the cold war, but in a very Canadian way. Canada wanted to help its allies fight communism, but in Asia at least Canadians spoke of preferring economic weapons. As Jean Lesage, parliamentary assistant for external affairs, said: “The technical assistance mission and experts constitute the ‘other forces of the United Nations.’ While the soldiers of the United Nations are fighting in Korea to repel aggression, it is the privilege of these other ‘forces’ to contribute directly to the well-being of the countries in which their operations are conducted and in so doing to help ease the present international tension” (Lesage 1952). The Canadian diplomatic self-image came to include a belief that Asians saw Canada as a disinterested country with no axes to grind, less threatening than its larger allies. “Canada has none of the political flavour which now attaches to the United States,” Smith noted. He denounced the “current alienation of the free Orient from the free West” as “appalling,” saying “Canadians do not generally recognize how significant a role they can and do play in intercultural affairs. We have a unique opportunity that other countries may well envy, to approach people throughout the world truly as equals.”xvii Canada had a competitive advantage in housing an organization like the IIS: it would not attract the same suspicions from Muslims in South Asia and elsewhere that would certainly be drawn by a similar project based in Britain or the United States. The Rockefeller Foundation agreed, seeing Canada as less liable to suspicion than either Britain or the US, but close enough to American centres to allow productive collaboration with the emerging area-studies complex.xviii So too did many Canadian diplomats. One noted disapprovingly in a report on an annual gathering of American Middle East scholars that a “strong sense of idealism and the spirit of missionary endeavour ... still characterize the thinking of many Americans about the Middle East.”xix The implication was that Canada was more understanding of the non-European world, and non-Europeans thus more open to Canadian initiatives. Canada was a loyal ally, fighting the same cold war, but had its own unique character. The IIS became one more piece of evidence bolstering this
self-image, another prop to the idea that Canadian foreign policy was one thing that differentiated Canada from the United States (Stairs 1998).

**The dream of modernizing Islam**

Although backed by area-studies money from the large foundations, the IIS insisted on seeing the Islamic world in its entirety as a cultural area, and Smith argued a humanistic brief against the social science bent of much of the “area studies” complex (Smith 1956). He dreamed of a centre outside that area able to help those from inside it face the challenge of modernity successfully. His thought evolved between his days studying under H.A.R. Gibb and his later prominence as the father of “world theology,” but certain ideas remained constant and were especially prominent in his McGill years. According to one remembrance, he was “a critic of ‘orientalism’ long before Said,” (Putnam et al 2001), but nevertheless he proved unable to transcend it entirely. His humanistic ideas led him to a very Orientalist vision of reshaping the future of Islam in Montreal.

Even before being hired by McGill, Smith made it clear that he would be approaching comparative religion in a different way. A divinity student, he wrote, must be not only someone who champions Christianity above other religions, but also religions in general. His work was devoted to understanding Islam’s attempt to come to terms with modernity, the same question that had recently confronted Christianity. And his loyalty was not to the doctrines of Christianity or any one church, but to God – the same priority he would urge upon Muslims (Smith 1957). He took the same approach in his McGill inaugural lecture, assailing those who studied other religions based on externals alone. “Such scholars,” he said acidly, “might uncharitably be compared to flies crawling on the outside of a goldfish bowl, making accurate and complete observations on the fish inside, measuring their scales meticulously, and indeed contributing much to our knowledge of the subject; but never asking themselves and never finding out, how it feels to be a goldfish” (McGill 1950).
Smith called throughout his career for “intercommunication,” for an interfaith dialogue aimed at mutual understanding, during a period when different cultures were coming into increasing contact with one another and with modernity. According to him, religions were being revealed to possess not unchanging essences but rather cumulative traditions subject to constant reinvention. After leaving McGill to devote himself fully to the study of comparative religions, he became one of the most influential Christian thinkers and interpreters of religion and religions of his generation. Some even credit Smith for eventually altering the United Church of Canada’s conception of mission into one that accepted each religion as a valid road to God (Smith 1953, McGill 1950, Cracknell 2001; Jones, Tadson 1984: 9-10). Smith’s most influential book in his McGill years was *Islam in Modern History*, the product in part of his doctoral work at Princeton. The book is poised oddly between his Orientalist schooling and his later world theology, mixing classic Orientalist sentences like “[t]he Arabs are a proud and sensitive people” with the assertion that Islam was not static but dynamic (Smith 1957: 50-1, 93). Smith later rejected some of his own categorization of Islam as a sealed religious category, choosing instead to study religions in general as part of the way humans relate to each other (Smith 1981: 27, Cracknell 2001: 236-7). At McGill, however, he dreamed of helping Islam come to terms with the modern world. Power relations being what they were, that meant on modern (Western) terms. The West remained monolithically “modern,” and modernity remained its gift to an Islamic world that was no longer viewed as unchanging and unchangeable, but remained in need of salvation from backwardness. Traditional Orientalism tried to gather information about classical Islam in order to understand and control Islam, Edward Said has argued. In studying a monolithic Islamic world, it created the object it sought to explain. Said (1978) analyzes the postwar American area-studies complex as the latest phase of Orientalism, a change in method but not in essence. Smith shared some of this critique, assailing both old-style Orientalism and the new
methodology-driven social science approach to area studies before it was fashionable to do so. In one of his early articles, he insisted that

a university cannot glibly subordinate its study of the Orient to the pragmatic desire of its society to cope with the Orient operationally.... We shall have failed in our task as orientalists if our society continues to imagine that the problem is how we in the West can deal with the Orient. The practical problem rather is how man throughout the world can deal with the fact that he is separated from his neighbor by a cultural frontier (Smith 1956).

He wanted to bridge the gulf between the Muslims, caught in prisons of their own traditions, and those Orientalists who studied them without sympathy. Smith was an internal dissident within Orientalism, a sympathetic scholar, but he continued in his McGill years to view modernity as something to be passed from the West to the Muslim world through such transmission belts as the IIS, then implemented by Muslims who had accepted the message.

“The Muslims must modernize their life; but they cannot do so without thinking through their own religion,” Smith argued in one early formulation of the IIS mission.

Amongst their (and indeed all orientals’) immense and manifold problems, none is more fundamental than their need of re-expressing their faith in twentieth-century terms.... Accordingly, members of the Muslim intelligentsia would, I have concrete reason to believe, be willing to come to a centre such as McGill to consider, in the dispassionate atmosphere of honest and informed religious inquiry, and away from the pressures and localisms of their own milieu, the problems of religion and modernity.... At its highest -- if you will not smile at the exaggerated ambition -- I would foresee our programme conceivably acting as a kind of midwife for the Islamic Reformation which is struggling to be born.

In his 1948-49 travels through the Middle East and South Asia, Smith was “fascinated by the deep, wide-ranging, and obviously critical transition through which Islam as an on-going force is currently going.” Islam, he became convinced, “is living through in our day a transformation comparable in scope and profundity, though not in form, to the Protestant Reformation in the history of Christianity.” The IIS, he hoped, could “make a notable contribution to that Islamic renascence and reformation.” For this rebirth to succeed, Muslims must come to terms with their religion and with modernity, “so that there is some point in what might otherwise seem paradoxical, a Muslim’s
coming to the West to study the twentieth-century crisis of his own culture.” xxiii Although his dreams were more those of the economist and the cold warrior, James shared Smith’s vision of the IIS as midwife to an Islamic reformation, comparing its mission to that of the influence of classical Greece on the West during its own passage into modernity. xxiv

Throughout the five-year start-up period, a tension lingered between Smith’s vision and that of skeptical Rockefeller Foundation officers. The Foundation was interested in the accumulation of information, “creating a better understanding of Islam as it is today” (Rockefeller Foundation 1951: 396). While accepting this, Smith stressed the goal of shaping Islam into the modern faith it could be. Foundation officers dismissed this thrust as missionary-inspired and unrealistic: why would Muslim students come to the West to study their own faith? Smith’s approach ultimately won over the Rockefellers, who expressed their conversion in the decision to award a long-term endowment. The Foundation praised Smith for offering something no other Orientalist could: a cooperative endeavour between Muslim and Western scholars. “It now seems clear,” according to the 1955 decision paper approving a new $500,000 grant, “that this latter commitment is to have consequences, earlier unpredictable, in Islam itself through the return to Islam of scholars and students who have participated in the Institute.” xxv This was a handy bit of self-justification, for although the Foundation’s people had not foreseen it, Smith had. He repeated his arguments to the Ford Foundation when he applied for funds to bring more Muslim students to McGill in order to help them become “as constructively engagés as possible. I do not feel that Hindus and Buddhists need this kind of thing quite so sorely, but Muslims seriously do.” Ford Foundation personnel in the Middle East agreed to recommend the IIS project because they “regard it as a sound means of assisting Islamic societies to ‘re-think’ traditional values in such a way that cultural continuity can be combined with social and economic progress.” xxvi This IIS vision – an Islamic reformation that
affirmed religious traditions by bringing them into conversation with modernity and the West – had its largest effect in Indonesia.

**Indonesia and the “McGill mafia”**

In *Islam in Modern History*, Smith had acknowledged a “lacuna” in his work, the omission of Indonesia. When the Institute of Islamic Studies opened, it had the same gap, but moved to address this so effectively that it quickly became the prime overseas training ground for Indonesian scholars of religion. Alongside US-trained army officers and the technocrats who came to be called the “Berkeley mafia,” a “McGill mafia” grew up and came to dominate the Ministry of Religion and the Islamic education system of Indonesia, becoming a crucial component of Indonesia’s modernizing elite (Smith 1957: 293, Federspeil 2002: 114, Steenbrink 1997; Ransom 1975). Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s regional focus was Pakistan, and IIS professor Fazlur Rahman returned home in 1962 to head a new Islamic Research Institute, facing later accusations that he was a pro-Western spy for the IIS. xxvii There would also be a branch of the IIS opened in Iran. But the Institute proved most influential in Indonesia, an area of peripheral interest to its initial programming.

Part of the move to include Indonesia came on Rockefeller Foundation urging. Many Americans had been hopeful that Indonesia might develop on the model of secularist Turkey, which had moved to “modernize” along Western lines, defining Islam as essentially a backward tradition (Sayyid 1997: 158). The hope was that other countries would choose this “Kemalist” path of development led by modernizing elites – not because secularizing was the best path, but because there were certain early stages of economic development in which developing states were vulnerable to communist subversion (Nasr 2001; Rostow 1960). The best hope for this in Indonesia lay with the Masyumi party, an alliance of Muslim organizations which played a leading role in the politics of the Republic after 1945. Masyumi was the voice of moderate political Islam, seeking a more thoroughly
Islamized state in opposition to secularizing nationalists, but also acting as a “modernist” voice within Indonesian Islam in opposition to traditionalists. When Masyumi failed to win Indonesia’s first national elections in 1955, its leaders became increasingly disillusioned with the direction of Indonesian politics. In 1957, many of them became the civilian face of a rebellion against the Sukarno government. After defeating the rebellion, Sukarno banned Masyumi. Just as Western government hopes for a pro-Western Indonesia rested on Masyumi, the first IIS forays into Indonesia tended to focus on its brand of reform Islam. The reformist (or modernist) movement within Islam flourished beginning in the late 19th century with its centre in Egypt and won the allegiance of many Muslims in Indonesia. “The apparent modernism of their [reformers’] activities,” according to Laffan (2003: 8), “lies in the fact that they sought to enact reform with an emphasis on the rational and personal, rediscovery of a pristine Islamic past, and the employment of all forms of modernity compatible with this ‘pure’ Islam.” Given common concerns with the issue of facing modernity, it is not surprising that all the Indonesians who clustered at the IIS in the 1950s and 1960s came from this reformist stream.

The IIS received the Indonesian government seal of approval with visits by Usman Sastroamijoyo, the Indonesian ambassador and brother of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo, and then by Sukarno himself. Smith traveled to Indonesia in 1955; he returned in 1957 as an official state guest along with Principal James. In 1958, using Ford Foundation money, Smith hired Mohammad Rasyidi on a five-year appointment to teach Islam in Indonesia. Born in 1915 with the very Javanese moniker Saridi, Rasyidi changed his name as an expression of his commitment to Islam. He studied religion at the University of Cairo, a more reformist alternative to Al-Azhar University. Rasyidi served as an assistant in the Office of Native Affairs, the primary means by which the Dutch colonial regime studied and controlled Islam, and then headed the Islamic Library in Jakarta under the Japanese occupation. He became the Indonesian Republic’s first Minister of Religion in 1946,
creating the ministry that in effect succeeded the Office of Native Affairs. As Minister, he stressed tolerance and freedom of worship while insisting religion had a place in the state, carving out a middle path between adherents of an Islamic state and those who wanted a purely secular Indonesia. That meshed well with the IIS view of religion’s place in society. Rasyidi earned his doctorate in Islamic studies while studying under Louis Massignon in Paris, with Rockefeller Foundation assistance. Returning to the diplomatic service as Ambassador to Pakistan, he grew more and more disillusioned with the direction of the government. While many devout Muslim diplomats backed the 1957-58 rebellion, Rasyidi instead took refuge in an offer to teach at the IIS and enrolled his daughter at McGill. xxix

At the IIS, Rasyidi leaned on the traditional canon of Dutch authorities, including the Dutch Orientalist and colonialist Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, best-known of a line of scholar-advisers to the Dutch East Indies government paid to serve as tutors to “a backward and suspicious religion” (Steenbrink 1993: 24). Snouck Hurgronje wanted to “emancipate” Muslims from their religion. He earned his reputation by penetrating the shrine of Mecca disguised as a pilgrim, then applied his knowledge to a study of the strongly-Muslim people of Aceh, harnessing anthropological and religious study to the conquest of one outlying part of the Indies. His strategy helped the Dutch complete their colonial war in Aceh and he was rewarded with the leadership of the Office of Native Affairs from 1889 to 1906. From this position, he tried to reshape Islam by divorcing it from politics and making it a personal faith like his own Protestant Christianity (Benda 1958, Steenbrink 1993, Snouck Hurgronje 1916, Snouck Hurgronje 1906, Snouck Hurgronje 1931). One 1957 tribute pointed out that Snouck Hurgronje was much concerned with the question: “How should one govern Muslims in order to smooth their way towards modern times and if possible to gain their cooperation in the realization of the ideal of a universal civilization[?]” (Drewes 1957: 4). That was, in short, the mission of the Office of Native Affairs, which continued to exist until the end of the colonial era.
Even Rasyidi was enmeshed by its spell. Although in 1946 he had described the Office as “nothing but a very dangerous instrument of imperialism,” Rasyidi continued to lean on its teaching authority, defending Snouck Hurgronje and reserving his sharpest scorn for Muslim backsliders (Rasyidi 1946: 25, Azra 1994: 104).

The first Indonesian fellowship students arrived at the IIS in 1955-6, a period when the Islamic movement in Indonesia, disappointed by Masyumi’s failure to win the 1955 elections, was turning to internal strengthening, especially within the Religion Ministry. Four earned their master’s degrees by 1961 and returned to Indonesia to work for the Ministry of Religious Affairs or teach in Islamic universities.xxx

The most prominent of the first wave of Indonesian students was Abdul Mukti Ali. Born eight years after Rasyidi, he too changed his Javanese given name (from Boedjono) when he embraced devout Islam. Mukti Ali fought for independence in Masyumi’s militia during the Indonesian revolution and went on to study in Mecca and Karachi. In 1955 he transferred to McGill to study comparative religion under Smith, winning a scholarship from the Asia Foundation. After earning his MA from McGill, he returned in 1957 to become an assistant to the Minister of Religion charged with administering the university-level State Islamic Institutes (IAINs). Within his first year back, he had already represented Indonesia at two international conferences on religion. In 1960, he took charge of the new IAIN programme in comparative religion and authored its text book, *Ilmu Perbandingan Agama [The Science of Comparative Religions]*. Mukti Ali credited Smith’s “holistic approach” to the study of religions with shaping his own ideas (Munhanif 1996).

Harun Nasution became almost as prominent as Mukti Ali. Born in North Sumatra in 1919, he went for higher study to the Haram Mosque. Nasution, already leaning to modernist Islam over the orthodox forms predominant in his home and in Arabia, called Mecca “a medieval city in the modern age” and soon moved to Egypt: first to Al-Azhar and then to the American University.
Armed with a BA in social science, he took a job working with Rasyidi in the Indonesian Embassy which set him on the path to a diplomatic career. This ended in 1957 when he joined dissident Indonesian diplomats in backing the Sumatra-based rebels, partly because he felt Sumatra was oppressed and partly because they were “the anti-communist faction.” He returned to Egypt to study “rational and modern” Islam and then followed Rasyidi to McGill, earning his MA in 1965 and his doctorate in 1968 with a controversial dissertation that argued reformist Muslims had misunderstood the Egyptian modernizer Mohammad Abduh. Nasution later recalled the crucial influence of the IIS on his own thinking:

At McGill I obtained a wide viewpoint on Islam. Not Islam as studied at Al-Azhar in Egypt. At McGill I had opportunity.... There, it was liberal. Free. So, it was easy to inquire. There, I first saw Islam as having a rational character [bercorak rasional]. Not irrational Islam as found in Indonesia, Mecca and Al-Azhar.... Islam was very rational. It was at McGill that I became aware: the teaching of Islam within and without the Islamic world were very different (Nasution 1989: 34, author’s translation).

At McGill, Nasution had come to share Smith’s view of all the major monotheistic religions as valid paths to redemption. He returned to a teaching post at IAIN Jakarta in Islamic philosophy, later becoming rector. Since the university was, in Nasution’s view, “still very traditional,” he proposed a new curriculum for teaching Islam, based on McGill’s, which was implemented in modified form (Muzani 1994, Nasution 1989, Steenbrink 1997, Porter 2002: 56, IAIN 1996: 2).

The earliest Indonesian IIS students and the first Indonesian professor all played prominent roles in the administration of religion on their return. Rasyidi returned to Indonesia in 1965 to campaign against communism, publishing Islam menentang Komunisme [Islam against Communism]. That year and the next, an army-led campaign saw large numbers of Muslims take violent reprisals against members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and hundreds of thousands of other suspected leftists (Roosa 2006). Estimates of the death toll run as high as one million. Rasyidi turned next to polemics against Christian missionaries, fueled in part by the conversion of significant numbers to Christianity in the wake of the massacres (Azra 1994).
After 1965, General Suharto’s “New Order” military regime viewed political Islam as the major remaining threat to its power. New Order ideology emerged in practice, not as a fully-formed system of thought. The ideology of development (pembangunan) became the regime’s main legitimizing factor, but was only given formal expression after the new regime had consolidated its power. General Ali Murtopo, a prominent ideologue of the early New Order, defined development as economic progress, and modernization as “changing norms which are no longer functional in the development of society and changing norms which hinder development.” In order for Indonesia to pass through the necessary “stages of development,” there had to be mental changes too. Village populations should be depoliticized and transformed into a “floating mass” which would concentrate solely on the tasks of development, while the armed forces would act as the prime modernizing agent (Murtopo 1973: 51, 85-7). Islam, too, had to be depoliticized and harnessed to the task of development. Benedict Anderson interprets the New Order as having many of the characteristics of the colonial state, concerned above all with controlling society (Anderson 1983). In its attitude to political Islam, the Suharto regime took on the full range of colonial state characteristics. Like the Office of Native Affairs, the regime in its early years hoped to move Islam into the private sphere. After stage-managed elections in 1971 won by the military’s political vehicle, Golkar, the government moved against the largest remaining independent party, the Javanese Muslim Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Religious Scholars). The NU had survived Sukarno’s purge of the Masyumi and then Suharto’s rise to power, all the while retaining the Religion Ministry as its own fiefdom. To eliminate a potential political competitor, the Suharto regime wanted to change that.

So too, for different reasons, did the first Indonesian scholars to return from McGill. Mukti Ali and Nasution were leading figures in the Gerakan Pembahuruan (renewal movement) within Indonesian Islam in the late 1960s and early 1970s. A 1968 seminar among Muslim intellectual leaders in Jakarta showed a divergence between Islamic idealists seeking a Muslim political party,
centrists who pressed for Islamic unity outside the electoral arena, and pragmatists led by Mukti Ali, who preferred “a concentration on specific piecemeal development-oriented schemes instead of totalistic theoretical expositions” (Hassan 1982: 75). This third group proved willing to accommodate to the new regime. Mukti Ali was no secularizer: he insisted that religion had a crucial place within the development process, making it about not only providing material growth, but also about allowing people to realize their dignity as human beings and in making social justice the main goal of development (Mukti Ali 1971). The Renewal Movement took strong exception to the characterization of Islam as a barrier to development and dismissals of rural Muslims as “the sarong-wearing group,” insisting instead that Islam could be a vital part of the development of Indonesia. Its pre-eminent thinker, Nurcholish Madjid (who would later be a visiting professor at McGill) preached that Islam should become more personalistic and rational. This dovetailed with the goals of New Order modernizers exemplified by Ali Murtopo, but it was nevertheless an autonomous development within Indonesian Muslim thinking (Hassan 1982). Its effect, however, led to an alliance with the New Order regime. In order to promote rural development and the depoliticization of rural society, the regime needed the help of the ulama, local religious leaders. Linking the military government and the ulama in what he saw as the interests of the Muslim community was one of Mukti Ali’s prime concerns. In return for the inclusion of Islam in development, he called upon ulama become teknokrat samawai (heavenly technocrats) backing development and stability (Hassan 1982: 169; Mukti Ali 1978). This is similar to how the Dutch colonial regime had tried to harness Islam to the service of the state, but this time many Muslim leaders proved amenable. There was no nefarious scheme to ally with the military: rather, the interests of the IIS graduates and Ali Murtopo’s group complemented each other.

Of the four possible names for the new Minister of Religion, two were McGill graduates: Mukti Ali and Timur Jaelani. President Suharto selected Mukti Ali as the best man to both
modernize Indonesian Islam and handle inter-religious dialogue, while Timur Jaelani served as Secretary-General of the ministry. The new brooms at the Religion Ministry modernized the Islamic schools and IAINs, working with the country’s new military rulers to depoliticize Islam in exchange for participation in the country’s new developmentalist trajectory (Federspiel 1998: 25-7, Munhanif 1996, Porter 2002: 53-6, Steenbrink 1997, Hefner 2000: 93, McDonald 1980: 133-4). Ironically, Rasyidi became a leading critic of McGill-trained Islamic modernizers, who he accused of serving a regime determined to reduce the power of Islam through such steps as secularizing aspects of marriage law and accepting Javanese mysticism as a valid religion. The New Order was indeed trying to shape Islam into a more quietistic force that would not challenge its authority. Yet the first generation of the McGill mafia were no mere tools of a centralizing regime. They were also pursuing a consistent course in line with “the Montreal viewpoint,” trying to transform the way Islam was understood in Indonesia. One analysis of Mukti Ali’s thinking has argued that “by perceiving that faith is personal; that faith includes any system of religious belief such as Javanese spiritualism; that religion should be carried out with dialogue, and so forth, Mukti Ali actually provides some room for the New Order’s government to work with this kind of ‘Smithian thought’ towards a modern religious policy in Indonesia” (Munhanif 1996: 121-2). Smith would hardly have embraced the New Order regime, born in blood and sustained through the continued systematic violation of human rights. But just as his project of cross-cultural communications and mutual understanding was also a quest to “modernize” the shape of Islam, so too his Indonesian students sought to modernize Islam as practiced in their country. To achieve this, they accepted the New Order’s developmentalist project.

In his term from 1971-77, Mukti Ali became “the first in a line of ministers of religion to preside over policies for the creation of a cadre of western educated Muslim intellectuals to counter the practice of sending Muslim graduates to universities in the Middle East” (Porter 2002: 55). This second wave cemented the reforms initiated by the earliest McGill graduates and continued the
practice of sending students to Western universities to study Islam. It also helped the IIS escape a funding crisis as its Ford Foundation income dried up in the 1970s. Here the interests of the IIS and those of the Canadian government coincided. The Trudeau government overturned previous aid patterns, making once-neglected Indonesia into a country of concentration. The 1970s Canadian government paid more attention to Indonesia because of a renewed stress on trans-Pacific trade relations, an increased emphasis on development and relations with developing countries, a willingness to take on regional commitments being shed by a retrenching United States, and a policy of bilateral concentration on identified partners: one of which was Indonesia, seen as a good fit to receive what Canada had to offer (External Affairs 1970, Nossal 1994, MacGuigan 2002, Pratt 1994, Trudeau and Head 1995, Granatstein and Bothwell 1990; Scharfe 1996). The Canadian International Development Agency paid increasing attention to Indonesia. By the 1980s, Indonesia ranked second among all Canadian aid recipients. As part of that growth, CIDA offered scholarships to Indonesians to study at the IIS from 1972-75 as the first concrete Canadian support for the IAIN system (incidentally fulfilling Smith’s calls in the 1950s for a small part of Canadian aid funds to be committed to the sort of humanities-based cultural interchange represented by the IIS). More scholarships for the same purpose came from the Connecticut-based Hazen Foundation. This saved the IIS from a feared 80% drop in Muslim students resulting from loss of other funds and rising fees for international students. Such a drop would have shattered the original IIS vision of a centre composed of roughly equal numbers of Muslim and Western students. CIDA stepped up its involvement in 1990 by kicking in $6-million over five years for the IIS to strengthen the capacity of the IAIN system directly and by bringing IAIN teachers for graduate training at McGill; the project was renewed after the success of this first phase with $12.4-million in CIDA funds for 1995-2000, and renewed for a third phase in 2001. The effect on the IIS was substantial, the effect on the IAINs even more so. By the 1980s, three-quarters of IAIN instructors receiving higher training went
to Western universities to get it; by the mid-1990s, more than 200 IAIN instructors had studied Islam in Montreal on CIDA scholarships. Of the 24 universities which IAIN forged links, McGill was the one that remained most intensively involved. The IIS had led the shift away from traditional Middle Eastern centres of learning to Western schools (Effendy 1998: 404, Jabali 2001, IAIN 1996, IAIN 2000).

Paradoxically, a project heartily endorsed by the New Order regime produced some of that regime’s sharpest critics. The McGill-IAIN project focused on building IAIN’s “capacity and role as an agent or vehicle of development and of strengthening of civil society and civil values.” The IAIN vision, traceable back to Smith, of a “pluralistic, tolerant form of Islam, secular in its orientation, and committed to respect for human rights and social equity,” produced demands for human rights and social equity that were increasingly directed at the Suharto regime, whose developmentalist project emerged as opposed to greater human rights and often spurred greater income disparities. “Over the past two decades,” an IAIN team wrote in assessing the relationship with McGill, “an Islam based on tolerance and inclusiveness has taken root as mainstream Islam in Indonesia.” (IAIN 2000). Calls from Muslim intellectuals for an expanded civil society (masyarakat madani or masyarakat sipil) ran directly counter to the New Order’s stress on depoliticization, and contributed to the fall of Suharto in 1998 (Hefner 2000). This group, for instance, is today prominent among liberal Muslims such as those involved in the 2005 Jakarta assembly of the Congress of Democrats from the Islamic World, whose pluralistic vision is pitted against the more fundamentalist vision of the state-sanctioned Islamic Scholars Council – not to mention the violent proponents of an Islamic state behind the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005 (Hainsworth, forthcoming).
Conclusion

While the government paid little attention to Asian states seen as peripheral, organizations such as McGill’s Institute of Islamic Studies carved out an important role in shaping the direction of Indonesian Islam, and ultimately of Indonesian politics. A university-based programme had repercussions far beyond its borders, becoming a significant actor in international relations in its own right. It was influenced by the strategic goals of the major US-based foundations and governments that saw the Muslim world, if shaped properly, as a potential anti-communist partner. The IIS aimed to promote cross-cultural communications and internal reform within Islamic societies. Almost accidentally, that vision influenced Indonesia more than any other Muslim country. Once the IIS influence on Indonesia became visible, the Canadian government embraced its approach, making McGill’s support for the State Islamic Institute (IAIN) system into the most significant Canadian aid project directed at Indonesia. The IIS, a non-governmental actor, had pointed the way towards an important element of Canadian government strategy towards Indonesia.

The aims and objectives of the IIS complemented Canadian government strategies. Canada wanted to see aid used as a lever to modernize Asian societies and hold them to the Western side in the cold war. Similarly, the IIS saw itself as a Canadian institution with a role to play in fostering understanding and a community of between the West and the Islamic world, while helping Islam to modernize itself. Informal ties between Ottawa and the IIS, along with similar places within the Western alliance system and the North American area studies complex respectively, helped ensure similar approaches to an important Asian country, well before CIDA began to fund McGill’s Indonesia programming. The IIS set its own directions, and had its own foreign policy in miniature, but they were not wholly autonomous from the directions set by the Canadian state within the Western alliance and the international system. Nor were its Indonesian graduates operating wholly autonomously of the Indonesian state. A study of the early years of the IIS suggests that non-
governmental organizations, including universities, play an important role in international relations. They can often influence government policies, but they are in turn influenced: civil society does not operate autonomously from government strategies and international relations (Swift 1999). The IIS intent was couched as pure humanistic endeavour, but its effect was inevitably political. Acting as midwife to an Islamic reformation was a colonialist vision in some ways, certainly an Orientalist one in the new style; that made it easier for the “McGill mafia” in Indonesia to fall into an alliance with the early New Order.

The creation of the IIS was driven by humanistic inquiry, but it was also a small element of the much larger cold war. With the Soviet communist enemy making a bid for the loyalty of radical Third World nationalisms, Western governments could see political Islam as a possible ally, whether it came in the form of the 1950s Masyumi party in Indonesia, or Afghan mujahideen fighting the Soviet occupation of their country in the 1980s. Intercultural communication on the IIS model might help attract Muslim support for the Western side, while the notion of promoting an Islamic reformation was at least compatible with modernization theory (Latham 2000). Today, the idea of an enemy has shifted from communism, to political Islam as exemplified by Al Qaeda and, in Indonesia, by the Jemaah Islamiyah network blamed for bombings in Bali and Jakarta. In Indonesia, the IAINs eventually became centres of freer thought and critical inquiry, encouraging the growth of a strong civil society that toppled the Suharto regime in 1998. In trying to promote a more non-political Islam through higher education, as a means to repress political Islam, the regime sowed some of the seeds for a new form of Muslim opposition. The fact that the McGill-IAIN relationship was sustained over an extended period made it harder and harder for the Suharto regime to use it as a tool for control. In post-Suharto Indonesia and the post-9/11 world, the brand of pluralistic Islam promoted through the IIS seems more important than ever. It is also important to have an awareness that university-based international relations are not conducted autonomously from state strategies.
Canada, in part through the IIS, has a longstanding academic connection with the Muslim world that the United States lacks, one that can be seen as a tool in the new “war on terror” (Federspiel 2002), but one that must therefore be wielded all the more carefully in the hopes that it does not become a weapon.

Opening the Tehran branch of the IIS in 1973, McGill vice-Principal Stanley Frost planned to speak of the “great importance of the underlying purpose of the Islamic Institute: that is, that men of different traditions are learning to know one another and so come to understand and appreciate one another.” The words and the spirit remain relevant, now that political Islam is seen as the West’s greatest enemy. It provides a vital contrast to binary “clash of civilizations,” “with us or against us” thinking. There is still talk of trying to “modernize” Islam, talk that refuses to see the long tradition of reform within Islam and tends to dismiss the efforts being made by Muslims, in favour of attempting to impose change from the West. The project of mutual understanding needs to be divorced as much as possible from this mission to deliver modernity, defined as remaking Muslim societies in the Western image, and from entanglements with state strategies that too often are aimed at controlling an adversary.

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All Indonesian names have been rendered according to the current spelling system: thus Sukarno, Rasyidi, Sastroamijoyo instead of Soekarno, Rasjidi, Sastromidjojo. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 Canadian Historical Association. I am grateful for comments there and in response to earlier drafts of this article from Steven Lee, Alexander Woodside, and the anonymous readers. I am also grateful for the generous help of archivists at the McGill University Archives, Rockefeller Archive Centre, United Church Archives and Library and Archives Canada.


The phrase is taken from Rockefeller Foundation (RF) decision RF55169, 6-7 Dec. 1955, Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC), Rockefeller Foundation (RF) records, RG1.2, series 427R, box 10, file 93.


**Collected Papers of Howard M. Federbush, Set 1: Graduate School Papers and Theses at McGill University (Newark, OH, 1994), p. 4-10; Smith to James, 8 Oct. 1962, MUA, RG2, box 274, file 8263; note on RF visit to McGill, 8 Oct. 1958, RAC, RG1.2, 427R, box 11, file 100.**

**Excerpt from RF interview with Paul Romeril, 25 Jan. 1959; Romeril’s report to Ford Foundation, 30 May 1959.**

**RG2, box 356, file 13189.**

**On the rebellion, see Audrey R. Kahin and George McT. Kahin,** *Subversion as Foreign Policy: the secret Eisenhower and Dulles debacle in Indonesia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995).

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